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COMMENTARY
Agency Shops and the Public Sector: An
Economic Analysis
ROBERT J. STAAF* AND EDWIN G. WEST*
Traditionally, legislators and jurists have justified union and
agency shops by resorting to the twin spectors of unequal bargain-
ing power and free riders. Recently, the Supreme Court of the
United States upheld the constitutionality of a state statute re-
quiring an exclusive agency shop in the public educational labor
market. Using this decision as a reference point, the authors pres-
ent a Critical economic analysis of exclusive agency shops in the
public sector labor market utilizing both a competitive and mo-
nopoly labor market model. They argue that the social and eco-
nomic costs of a labor monopoly, the exclusive agency shop, may
outweigh any possible benefits. Furthermore, they argue that the
free rider hypothesis does not have an empirical foundation.
Thus, they conclude that the arguments in favor of intervention
in the competitive labor market are not persuasive.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Agency shops are to be distinguished from union -shops in that
although agency shops compel employees to pay a service charge as
a contribution to the union's collective bargaining expenses, they do
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not require actual membership in the union. The Supreme Court of
the United States has previously ruled that public sector labor
agreements which condition employment on agency or union shop
membership do not, on their face, impinge upon constitutionally
protected rights of association. I Recently, in A bood v. Detroit Board
of Education, 2 the Court upheld the constitutionality of agency shop
clauses in the public employment sector. It held that public sector
employees, like those in the private sector, may be compelled to pay
union service charges for legitimate collective bargaining activities.
3
The Court refused to hold unconstitutional the state statute4
out of deference to the state legislature,5 analogizing it' to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") 7 and the Railway Labor Act
("RLA"). The economic analysis employed by the Court parallels
the construction given the NLRA and the RLA,1 and this analysis
is representative of that used on other occasions."
This commentary presents a critical economic analysis of the
central reasoning underlying the legislative and judicial approval of
agency shops.
II. THE PREMISES UNDERLYING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The NLRA leaves regulation of the labor relations of state and
local governments to the states." The Michigan law in question in
Abood, however, was broadly modeled after federal law. 2 The
Court, therefore, drew upon past judicial interpretations of federal
labor law in construing the state statute. 13 One of the central theses
1. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
2. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
3. Id. at 232. In order to avoid any violations of the first and fourteenth amendments,
the Court further held that the assessments were to be used exclusively to finance expendi-
tures for collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance adjustment purposes.
Consequently, nonunion employees may not be compelled to pay for "political" expenditures.
Id. at 232-37.
4. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(10) (1975).
5. 431 U.S. at 224-25.
6. Id. at 223.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1970).
8. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1970).
9. On their face, neither the NLRA nor the RLA adopted any particular economic prem-
ises; see 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970); 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1970). The Supreme Court, however, has
read certain economic premises into the statutes; e.g., Abood, 431 U.S. at 220-23; Oil, Chem.
& Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Mobile Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 416 (1976); Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Organization, 420 U.S. 50, 67-70 (1974); NLRB v. General
Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 740-41 (1962); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367
U.S. 740, 760-61 (1961).
10. E.g., Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970).
12. 431 U.S. at 223.
13. Id. at 217-37.
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of the Court's economic analysis was the reasoning which gave rise
to the NLRA and the RLA." The goals of federal labor law, inter
alia, have previously been interpreted as redressing unequal bar-
gaining power and the maintenance of industrial peace."5 Moreover,
collective bargaining and exclusive representation have been seen as
a means of accomplishing both of these goals. The Court in Abood,
however, was notably silent on any reference to unequal bargaining
power and its analysis emphasized the goal of labor stability and
peace.
In spite of the restrictions to free employment that the union
shop created, Congress had nevertheless decided that nonunion
employees could be legitimately obliged to defray the substantial
expense involved in union bargaining activities.'" The majority
opinion observed:
The designation of a single representative avoids the confusion
that would result from attempting to enforce two or more agree-
ments specifying different terms and conditions of employment.
It prevents inter-union rivalries from creating dissension within
the work force and eliminating the advantages to the employee
of collectivization. It also frees the employer from the possibility
of facing conflicting demands from different unions, and permits
the employer and a single union to reach agreements and settle-
ments that are not subject to attack from rival labor organiza-
tions.7
This reasoning merely amounts to an argument that the per
capita cost of negotiation is lower when channelled through an ex-
clusive agent. In addition, the argument assumes that the use of
compulsion to oblige all employees to contribute to the negotiation
costs is necessary in order to alleviate the effects of the "free rider"
problem. 8 The Court presumed that where free riders are allowed
to operate in a noncompulsory setting, serious disharmony in labor
relations will result. Furthermore, it was emphasized that the prob-
lem of free riders was not confined to the private sector."9 Under the
paradigm adopted by the Court, labor stability and peace would be
achieved only in a system of exclusive representation."
14. Id.
15. NLRB v. Allis-Chambers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1966).
16. See 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1970) (authorizes union shops). The Supreme Court
has held that this section of the RLA is designed to force all employees to share the costs of
negotiation and general administration of the bargaining system. International Ass'n of Ma-
chinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961).
17. 431 U.S. at 220-21.
18. Id. at 221-22; see section III-C infra.
19. "The desirability of labor peace is no less important in the public sector, nor is the
risk of 'free riders' any smaller." 431 U.S. at 224.
20. The Court accepted the legislative findings because it was not competent "to judge
the wisdom of Michigan's decision to authorize the'agency shop in public employment." Id.
at 224-25 (footnote omitted).
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M. AN ECONOMIC MODEL: THE COMPETITIVE MARKET CASE
A. The Basic Analysis
The first model posited begins with an assumption of a compet-
itive market in the field of education, which is entirely nonpublic.
As in any market, buyers seek out sellers and sellers seek out buyers.
This process involves, at the very least, the expenditure of time
which has an economic value. Moreover, objective resources are
expended in transportation and communication. Once in touch with
each other, buyers and sellers have to search for mutually accepta-
ble terms of employment. This too takes time and involves further
costs such as legal documentation, setting up and conducting inter-
views, and employing experts.
It is important to notice that both buyers and sellers share in
the search costs. For instance, a seller of labor will incur time costs
of consulting job-opportunity columns, costs of mailing and follow-
ing up applications, and costs of transportation. Once in touch with
a prospective buyer of his labor, the potential worker will undergo
costs of negotiating terms and conditions. The purchaser of labor,
meanwhile, will be involved in search costs which involve expenses
in advertising, transportation and preliminary screening of suitable
candidates for the vacancies in question. Once the buyer is in touch
with prospective candidates, he will then contribute his further
share of the search costs by meeting the cost of interviews, by more
specific screening operations and by covering the costs of legal docu-
mentation. Figure I illustrates the competitive market for teachers.
The curve D, is the employer's demand curve for teaching services
per time period; the curve S, is the supply curve for teaching
services. In the absence of any search costs and assuming a competi-
tive market with homogeneous workers, the wage will be determined
at the industry level where the demand curve intersects the supply
curve at point E. The resulting wage will be We, and the quantity
of labor employed will be Q,.
The presence of search and negotiation costs inevitably result
in a contraction of the quantity of labor employed to Q,. The deter-
mination of Q, can be viewed as a decrease in supply causing the
supply curve to shift to the left with a new intersect at point F.
Alternatively, the situation can be seen as a decrease in demand
causing a parallel shift of the demand curve to the left, involving a
new intersect with the original supply curve at G.11 If, as is usually
21. The industry supply curve SI is the horizontal sum of the supply curves of all sellers
of labor in the market. When each supplier has to spend more time searching for an employ-









QUANTITY OF TEACHERS OR TEACHING SERVICES
EMPLOYED
Figure I
the case, the costs are borne by both the employer and employee,
both the supply and demand curve will shift. In Figure I, at Q,
employment, the search costs per unit of labor are represented by
the gap GF. If these costs are shared equally, the curves will inter-
sect at point H with the quantity of labor employed at Q, and a
corresponding wage of We. 22
Compared with the prior situation of zero negotiation cost
seeks to supply. Aggregated, this leads to a leftward shift of the supply curve in that each
quantity of teaching service will be forthcoming only at a higher price than before.
The industry demand curve D, reflects the aggregate amounts of teaching service that
society desires at various prices. An individual, however, may not obtain this, or any other
service, without searching for it. If the cost of the search is significant, the consumer must
substitute resources searching for the service that he would have spent in purchasing it. This
leads to a leftward shift in the demand curve in that each quantity of teaching services will
only be demanded at a price lower than before. See generally P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 64
(9th ed. 1973).
22. The search costs are shared because it is assumed that both the demand and supply
curves shift to the left so as to intersect at point H: The more elastic the supply or the demand
schedule, the less the search costs will be borne by the employee or the employer respectively.
Q, Qo
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(equilibrium at E and a corresponding wage of We), the employer
now is faced with an equilibrium at F, with a corresponding higher
gross wage Wg.13 The employer's share of the costs of negotiation is
the difference between We and Wg (or HF). The employee, mean-
while, faces a new net wage"' of W,, determined by the equilibrium
at G. His share of the search and negotiation costs is the difference
between We and W, or HG. The total search and negotiation costs
are the costs per worker (FG) times the number employed. This is
shown as the shaded area of the diagram, WgFGW.These costs,
as illustrated, are shared equally between the buyers and sellers of
labor.2
B. Institutional Frameworks for Handling the Costs of Negotiation
Conceptually, there are three basic institutional frameworks for
handling the costs of negotiation.2" First, employers may make indi-
vidual contracts with each separate employee. One way of doing this
would be for the employer to advertise a fixed wage, specific qualifi-
cations and enumerated employment conditions. The employees in
this case are price-takers. Although all the costs of negotiation
would be handled directly by the employer, this is not to say that a
share of these costs would not be borne by the employee. Some costs
would undoubtedly be reflected in a lower net wage.
The second method is the institution of the union or closed
shop. In this case, all employers would agree to negotiate exclusively
through one union. All employees, meanwhile, would be obliged to
be members of that union.
A third method, the one favored by the Court in A bood, is that
of the agency shop. In this alternative, all employees are obliged to
pay agency fees limited to the costs of negotiation. In the terminol-
ogy of the Abood decision, these include the costs of collective bar-
gaining, administering the contract and grievance procedures. 7
Nonunion employees would not be obliged to pay for other expenses,
23. Gross wages include the employer's share of the search costs.
24. Net wages are market equilibrium wages less search costs.
25. To give a numerical example, suppose that in the absence of search costs the equilib-
rium wage We equals $100 per time period. Further assume search costs equal to $50; that
is, in the given time period, it costs buyers and sellers an aggregate of $50 to meet and
negotiate a contract. FG represents this $50 cost. Assuming that search costs are shared
equally, at the market wage We (inclusive of search costs) the employee's paycheck remains
at $100. He expends $25, however, in search costs, as does his employer, resulting in a net
wage to the employee of $75 and a gross wage to the employer of $125.
26. These methods are not exclusive and variations may exist. One variation, periodic
competitive bidding by unions for the right of exclusive representation, will be discussed
later. See section IV-D infra.
27. 431 U.S. at 217-23.
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such as the cost of political lobbying by the union. Within the para-
meters of the analysis posited in this commentary, however, there
is no economic difference between an agency shop and a union or
closed shop.
The reasoning underlying both the A bood decision and the con-
gressional intent in enacting the NLRA is that exclusive representa-
tion through one agent keeps negotiation costs at their lowest.2 In
Figure I, this smallest possible negotiation cost is assumed to be the
shaded area." The presumption is that any .alternative proposals




QUANTITY OF TEACHERS OR TEACHING SERVICES
EMPLOYED
Figure II
Figure I compares the situation in Figure I with the costs of
applying the first method: each employer negotiates a separate con-
tract with each employee. These higher costs are assumed, in Figure
28. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.
29. This area represents the search costs, GF, multiplied by the total amount of employ-
ment, Q.
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II, to be JI and would result in a total lower employment of Q2. The
new cost area would be WgJJW. Assuming that the legislature's
view of comparative costs is accurate, the result of a change from
exclusive agent to individual negotiation would have two disadvan-
tages. The first is a reduction in employment from Q, to Q2. The
second is an increase in search costs which would, if shared by both
sides, increase the total cost to the employer and reduce the net
wage to the employee."0
C. Free Riders
Assume that the labor market is structured so that employees
have to negotiate their own contracts;-some workers would attempt
to join unions or other collective agents in an effort to reduce nego-
tiation costs. It would soon become apparent to them, however, that
other workers would "free ride" in the sense that they will offer their
services at the wage negotiated by others and therefore escape many
of the negotiation costs. Because of the manifestation of free riders,
the potential users of collective negotiation agents would eventually
hold back or withdraw from them unless all other workers were
obliged to pay their share of the costs.
This is the scenario that the Court had in mind when it referred
to free riders and the labor instability caused thereby. It should be
noted, however, that only when attempts are made by some workers
to obtain the services of collective agents, while other workers stand
back, is there any possible chance for the occurrence of worker dis-
sension, disturbances of industrial peace or interferences with labor
stability. When potential members of collective agents eventually
abandon their attempt to join because of the lack of cooperation
from the free riders, the situation reverts back to the first institu-
tional alternative: individual negotiation. This is represented in
Figure II with employment of Q2 and search costs of JI.
It is apparent, however, that the Court was in error in believing
that this situation is synonymous with labor instability. At this new
point of equilibrium, labor stability prevails because there is no
further incentive to change from this position. A further reason for
concluding that labor dissension will not occur, at least in the long
run, is that at this equilibrium all workers will contribute the same
amount in negotiation costs. In the competitive situation assumed
30. Continuing with the example developed in note 25 supra, the difference between FG
and IJ is $50. If this additional negotiation cost is shared equally, then the employee's
paycheck is still $100; however, he now expends $50 in search costs to find the employer and
the employer spends $50 to find the employee. The result is that the employee's net wage is
$50 and the employer's gross wage is $150.
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here, if any one employer attempts to impose a higher negotiation
cost on one employee, employers elsewhere in the system will bid
for the services of the "exploited" worker at a lower cost of negotia-
tion. A succession of such costs will bring all negotiation costs to
equality. Such an outcome also rules out another of the fears of the
legislature and the Court: fear that confusion will prevail in the
absence of an agency shop. Clearly, there can be no confusion if
uniformity of gross and net wages prevails.
The free rider argument is premised on the assumption that
consumers of public goods and services will fail to reveal their true
preferences.3 In the conventional competitive market of divisible
private goods, such demand revelation problems do not occur. If the
consumer should attempt to feign his preferences for a private good
or service in an attempt to pay a lower than competitive price for
it, he will simply fail to make a purchase because the seller can turn
to alternative buyers who are willing to pay a higher price. More-
over, the consumer will generally find it more economical, in terms
of transaction costs, to turn to competitive sellers if he believes he
can purchase goods or services more cheaply rather than by engag-
ing in expensive bargaining costs with a single seller.
The essential characteristic of a private good or service is that
the individual consumer is the sole beneficiary of its acquisition.
The usual example of the polar opposite is the public good or ser-
vice, with its attributes of jointness of efficiencies in production and
nonexcludability.32 Once the public good is produced, the addition
of any number of members to the consuming population will not
increase the costs even though everyone, including the new mem-
bers, will benefit. In other words, the marginal costs of production
are zero, and if one unit of the commodity is produced, it is impossi-
ble to exclude consumers even though they have not contributed to
the costs. It is in the case of public goods, therefore, where incen-
tives exist for individuals to understate or fail to reveal their true
preferences and to become free riders.
The difficulty with public goods or services, such as national
defense, is that if everyone takes a free ride in the sense of relying
on others to provide the commodity, none of the public commodity
will be voluntarily provided. In order to assure that essential public
goods are provided, a system of coercion, such as compulsory taxa-
tion, is established. It is on this reasoning that agency shops are
often justified.
31. Brubaker, Free Ride, Free Revelation, or Golden Rule?, 18 J.L. ECON. 147, 147 (1975).
32. C. FE USON & S. MAuRicn, ECONOMIC ANALYsis 399-400 (rev. ed. 1974).
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IV. AN ECONOMIC MODEL: THE LABOR MONOPOLY CASE
A. The Basic Analysis
The public goods component of agency shops is the supposed
reduction in costs that can be obtained from the agency shop as
compared with alternative bargaining methods. Without a collec-
tive agent the transaction costs of individual bargaining, which are
shared by the employer and the employee, are assumed to be area
WgJJW in Figure II. The introduction of the bargaining agent
is argued to reduce these costs to WgFGW,. The public goods re-
duction in transaction costs would then equal WgJJW, less
WgFGW. Under this assumption everyone gains. The government
(and therefore the taxpayers) pay a reduced gross wage rate, i.e., Wg
instead of Wg2. Employees, on the other hand, receive a higher net
wage, i.e., W, instead of W, and the demand for teachers expands
from Q, to Q,. Thus, the external benefits accrue to the taxpayers,
present employees and potential employees.
There is, however, a free rider problem in that, in the absence
of coercion, once a collective bargaining agreement has been
reached and cost savings are realized, one member may refuse to
pay his union dues which are somewhere between the difference of
W, and W. He will thereby increase his net wage above those of
his fellow employees and at their expense. If one individual has an
incentive to take a free ride, so do all employees. Eventually, the
voluntary collective bargaining unit will collapse; the situation will
revert to individual bargaining and higher transaction costs where
everyone is worse off.
While coercion can eliminate the free rider, it may also result
in other problems. The coercion involved in the agency shop may
lead to other side effects which fall in the general category of nega-











Assume that equilibrium has been reached at Q, employment and
search costs of FG. The legislature grants exclusive negotiation
rights to one agent, who is given a monopoly which will be enforced
by the full backing of the authorities. The agent will attempt, in
time, to exploit this monopoly position and eventually to charge a
higher monopoly price for the union's services.33 Although the nego-
tiation costs are priced initially at FG, there is no reason to suppose
that the price charged will stay at this level for long. Ultimately, the
price charged for exclusive bargaining rights may be pushed higher
33. A monopolist attempts to equate his marginal revenue with his marginal costs.
Marginal revenue differs from the demand curve in the monopoly case, absent price discrimi-
nation, in that a decrease in the price charged for the nth unit will affect revenues for all the
previous units. Thus, marginal revenue falls faster than the demand or average revenue curve.
The monopolist, therefore, charges a price higher than the marginal cost. G. STIGLER, THE
THEORY OF PRICE 195-99 (3d ed. 1966).
This concept can be illustrated by the following diagram:
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DEMAND








Pm and Qm are, respectively, the monopoly price and quantity. Note that the price is
higher and the quantity lower in the monopoly situation as compared to the competitive
situation, Pc and Qc. The loss to society is represented by the shaded triangular area.
Trade unions in the 1950's increased the relative union/nonunion wage by an estimated
10% to 15%. H. LEwis, UNIONISM AND RELATIVE WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES 193 (1963). The
relative wage differential in Great Britain is estimated to be between 19% and 60%. Metcalf,
Unions Income Policy and Relative Wages in Britain, 15 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 157, 159-62
(1977). See also Johnson & Mieszkowski, The Effects of Unionization on the Distribution of
Income: A General Equilibrium Approach, 84 Q.J. EcON. 539 (1970); Rees, The Effects of
Unions on Resource Allocation, 6 J.L. ECON. 69 (1963).
The above figures probably underestimate the total loss to national income because they
do not include expenditures incurred to obtain the monopoly rent which is a deadweight loss
because it is an activity that results in a zero sum redistribution. Such costs have been
estimated to be as high as $30 billion per year. M. Reynolds, The Free Riders Argument for
Compulsory Union Dues 17-18 (Sept. 15, 1978) (paper presented at the Conference on Eco-
nomic Aspects of Union Membership: Free Riders or Paying Customers; on file University of
Miami Law Review). See also Kuhn, Right-to-Work Laws-Symbols or Substance?, 14 INDUS.
LAB. REL. RPv. 587 (1961); Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5
W. ECON. J. 224 (1967).
[Vol. 33:645
AGENCY SHOPS
than the individual contracting equilibrium.34
In terms of Figure III, the initial benefits in contracting cost
reductions is WgJJW less WgFG W,. Since the exclusive agent has
a monopoly on bargaining, it is possible, at one extreme, that most
of these benefits will eventually be appropriated by him.35 A possible
means of avoiding monopoly rents is through the implementation of
a competitive bidding process. Different agents could place bids
with employees and employers on alternative contract packages
that include the administrative costs of executing the agreements.
Employees and their employers could negotiate over which of these
competitive bids are to be accepted. The single agent selected would
enjoy the right to provide the services for a particular period, e.g.,
two or three years. After the agent's contractual period has expired,
he would have to compete with other agency bidders for future
business. This type of competition for collective agents would result
in a competitive price charge of FG.5 There is little evidence, how-
ever, of any recognition of the need for this provision. Indeed, the
Court in Abood spoke of the social value of reducing competition
between unions, a situation it condemned as resulting from "union
rivalries.""1
An even greater loss to society results if the agency uses its
monopoly power in selling the services of the groups it represents.
The agency can undertake "aggressive" bargaining that leads to
wages above the normally competitive level of Wg, in Figure III."
Suppose such aggressive bargaining leads to a wage of Wg3. This
new monopoly wage will enlarge the total wage bill,3" and will have
two negative effects. First, there is an injury to a minority of teach-
ers who will lose their jobs. 0 This minority would be the difference
34. In Figure HI these costs are represented by gap IJ.
35. The agent will offer the employees whom he represents a wage that is only slightly
above the net wage they received before the exclusive agency agreement. At the same time,
he will demand a sum from the employer that is only slightly below the search costs prior to
the agency agreements. While both parties will be slightly better off, the exclusive agent will
appropriate almost the entire amount previously spent by the parties on search costs, This
sum will not be reduced through competitive bidding because the agency is an exclusive one.
36. See Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. ECON. 55 (1968).
37. 431 U.S. at 220-21.
38. For an analysis of a similar situation, see note 33 supra.
39. In Figure I, the area of WgKQ.,O is greater than the area of WgJQO. A debate
exists over what union leaders attempt to maximize. The union may attempt to maximize
the total wage bill. This situation has the smallest effect on employment. On the other hand,
the union may attempt to negotiate the highest wage possible which would result in much
higher unemployment. Plausible union goals are the highest wage rate possible with the
smallest reduction in employment, but the demand curve illustrates that these are conflicting
goals. Because a union operates under majority rule, however, it is able to sacrifice a minority
of employees to the unemployment rolls for the benefit of the majority. See generally A. REES,
TIM EcoNoWcs OF TRADE UNIONS 52-54, 170-73 (1962); G. STMGLER, supra note 33, at 270.
40. The resulting unemployment suggests one line of constitutional attack on agency
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between Q, and Q3 labor units. The second negative factor is the
increased bill to the taxpayers represented by the difference be-
tween O Wg 3KQ3 and OWgIQ,.
B. Forced Riders
Under a market structure dominated by government interven-
tion into private transactions, there exists the possibility that
"forced riding" may occur. The concept of forced riding involves the
mandatory participation by private parties in economic transac-
tions which are intrinsically considered to involve public good com-
ponents without empirical estimates of the demand for such goods
or services. If the demand for the good or service is miscalculated
by the government, too many resources will be allocated to its pro-
duction, thus resulting in forced riding by those who are required
to participate. The crucial question then is the determination of
where forced riding ends and free ridig begins.
It is significant that, for policy purposes, the notion of the free
rider has, hitherto, rested on a priori reasoning. There has been no
empirical evidence that enables policymakers to make an informed
choice between the competing theories of revelation and nonrevela-
tion of demands for public goods or services." While the existing
empirical evidence has not supported the free rider hypothesis,
2 it
shops. In its decision in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959), the Court recognized that
"the right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession free from
unreasonable governmental interference comes within the 'liberty' and 'property' concepts
of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 492 (dicta). As can be seen, the compulsory agency shop
curtails employment opportunities, thus interfering with the liberty of some teachers to sell
their services at mutually agreeable wages. This results from the legislatively imposed exclu-
sive agency.
41. The problem of excluding free riders becomes costly primarily after the creation of a
collective good or service by voluntary agreement. Prior to a contract within the community
to produce the collective good, the good will not exist for any member and exclusion will apply
to all by definition. Since exclusion is the factor that elicits demand, private entrepreneurs
might suggest terms requiring an offer from an individual, provided that it is matched by
some assurance that the remainder of the community would make a similar offer. If other
members of the community do not eventually pay, the individual will have, in effect, a
"money-back" guarantee. At this ex ante stage, the dominant motive thus switches away
from the desire to free ride at the expense of the group to the wish to be assured that the
others will make an appropriate contribution. Similarly, the individual's offer becomes not
only his actual payment but also a commitment to others that he will participate. Brubaker,
supra note 31, at 152. Thus, individuals will behave according to Brubaker's "golden rule
of revelation" of demand for collective goods, rather than as free riders who purposefully
fail to reveal their preferences. Id. at 150-58. Under the rule of precontractual group ex-
cludability, the dominant tendency will be for each individual to reveal accurately his pref-
erence for a collective good or service, provided that he has some assurance that others
will match his offer in appropriate amounts. Thus, the golden rule of revelation hypothesis
is a rival of the free rider hypothesis.
42. The only scientific method of choosing between the golden rule of revelation and free
rider hypotheses is empirical testing; the results thus far have failed to support the free rider
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has been ignored by legislators and jurists. The proposition that
people do not reveal their preferences seems to have prevailed even
though it amounts to only an assertion. This assertion, moreover,
has typically been followed by another: the coercive police power of
government is required to induce full expression of demand for pub-
lic goods. The difficulty with this argument, however, is that ob-
vious police power alone cannot generate the necessary missing in-
formation. The resort to blunt coercion in the face of unverified
information may lead to unintended yet detrimental side effects.
A possible consequence is forced riding by individuals who are
coerced into expressing nonexistent demands for collective goods.
C. Agency Shops as the Cause of Free Riding
The Abood decision implies that one of the benefits of an
agency shop is its ability to use the power of collective bargaining
to countervail the power of a strong and potentially exploiting em-
ployer.43 The extreme case of potential exploitation of employees is
a "monopsony." A monopsony is a market situation in which there
is only one buyer for a given service; in the context of the employ-
ment market there would be only one employer. Such an employer,
in order to maximize profits, will usually pay a wage that is below
the marginal product of the employee. This lower wage results from
the fact that the employer is conscious that his demand for labor is
so large, relative to the supply, that his monopsony position requires
him to consider the effect of the increased wage rate he is required
to pay to enlarge his labor force."
Suppose an employer employed ten people at $100 each per
week; this results in a total weekly wage bill of $1,000. To get an
eleventh employee, he will have to pay him a higher wage, e.g., $105.
This new wage, however, will have to be paid to all of the previously
hired ten workers. The total wage bill, therefore, will be eleven times
$105 or $1,155, and the difference in the total wage bill will be $155.
This amount is the marginal wage. It exceeds the average wage of
$105 by $50. A maximizing employer would take on workers up to
the point where the value of their marginal product was equal, not
to the average wage, but to the marginal wage. In this example, the
marginal employee would, at a minimum, produce a marginal prod-
uct of $155, yet he would be paid a wage of only $105. The difference
hypothesis. Bohm, An Approach to the Problem of Estimating Demand for Public Goods, 73
SWED. J. ECON. 55, 55-56 (1971).
43. The Court adopted the reasoning of the NLRA. See note 14 and accompanying text
supra. The findings and declarations of policy of the NLRA specifically mention inequality
of bargaining power. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
44. See G. STIoLER, supra note 33, at 244-45.
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is sometimes referred to as the gains from monopsonistic exploita-
tion ."5
It is arguable that an agency shop system can so offset the
monopsony power as to bring back the equality between the value
of the marginal product and the wage. In this case the theory pre-
dicts an expansion of employment." The policy implications, how-
ever, are obscure. It would only be by coincidence that the bargain-
ing powers of both sides exactly offset each other to bring about the
solution just described. A newly authorized agency shop may have
monopoly powers stronger than those of the employer he is supposed
to offset. In this case the negotiated monopoly wage will be higher
than optimal and would result in unemployment. A further consid-
eration is that the extra gains from bargaining on the union's side
might be appropriated largely by the agent himself rather than
being distributed to the members of the agency. 41 The predictions
of the benign monopsony hypothesis are capable of being tested. If
agency shop legislation is soon followed by some decrease in employ-
ment, or even by no increase in employment, the benign monopsony
model would have been proven false. 8
In the original model posited, the competitive model, monop-
sony was absent because an employee could choose among a large
number of competing schools. The recent trend towards consolida-
tion of school districts may well have reduced considerably the num-
ber of alternative employers in most public educational systems.
Nevertheless, some choice still remains. It is not obvious, therefore,
that the description of the typical educational employer in A bood
approaches the monopsony model."8
The fundamental objection to erecting a monopoly union in the
A bood situation, with the aim of countervailing the power of a mon-
opsonistic employer, is that the employer is the government. As one
commentator has argued:
[I]t is one thing for private groups to countervail a big private
profit-seeking corporation and quite another for them to counter-
vail the government. (A system of political checks and balances
already exists.) The public employer is financed by the taxpayer
and is supposed to be subject to the control of and answerable to
the citizenry. In these respects, the public employer is irreducibly
different from the private employer.5"'
45. See id. at 205-07.
46. Id.
47. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
48. See G. STIGLER, supra note 33, at 239-42.
49. As the Court recognized, "government officials making decisions as the public
'employer' are less likely to act as a cohesive unit than are managers in private industry."
431 U.S. at 228.
50. R. Summers, Collective Bargaining and Public Benefit Conferral: A Jurisprudential
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The exclusive agency is often justified by cumulating the ra-
tionale of redressing an unfair bargaining advantage with other ra-
tionales such as a desire for stability and the eradication of free
riders.5 ' Such strong agency shops, however, will actually encourage
free riders, a result that is neither in the public's nor the employee's
interest."
Assume that unequal bargaining power prevails in the educa-
tional market and that teachers voluntarily organize and hire a
collective bargaining agent. Furthermore, assume that the agent
redresses unequal bargaining power so that the wages of all are
increased. Now, suppose that the bargaining agent bills his clients
for his services and that some teachers will free ride and refuse to
pay their portion of the fee. The necessary conclusion is that the
agency will eventually collapse. 3
A compulsory exclusive agency would, in the above hypotheti-
cal, safeguard the agency from collapse and preserve the gains
achieved, but it might also give rise to harmful effects. Assume that
the collective agent now tries to redistribute these gains to a major-
ity of his clients so that a minority are worse off.5 Under voluntary
membership agreements, those who lost on the redistribution would
obviously drop out of the union and bargain individually with the
employer. Thus, the voluntary withdrawal acts as a check on the
collective agent.
In contrast, compulsory membership and fees coupled with the
exclusive agent eliminates the check on the agent. Some employees
may subsequently form a majority coalition to elect an agent who
has the exclusive right of bargaining. This majority will now free
ride, not by avoiding a share of the costs of collective bargaining,
but by utilizing their majority voting power to reap all the gains of
the collective bargaining while forcing the minority to contribute to
the costs. Another form of free riding occurs as a result of increasing
wages to the point that unemployment results. In this case the
majority is receiving a free ride from those who were formerly em-
ployed and who thereafter became unemployed.
This kind of free riding is much more pernicious than the type
sought to be remedied by the exclusive agency. Under voluntary
Critique 11 (Nov. 1976) (IPE Monograph No. 7, Institute of Public Employment, N.Y. State
School of Industrial and Labor Relations) (on file University of Miami Law Review).
51. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 753-64 (1961).
52. See notes 33-40 and accompanying text supra.
53. See section Ill-C supra.
54. An extreme example of this redistribution could occur if the union raises the price
of labor above the optimal level. Under such circumstances there would be a decline in
employment. Thus, the majority would benefit from higher wages while the minority would
not receive anything.
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arrangements, the costs of the free ride are shared by a large number
of fellow employees whereas under compulsory systems free riding
imposes costs that are concentrated on a few.
D. Individual Versus Collective Agencies
In order to illustrate the effects of governmental interference in
competitive markets, the example will be changed from purchases
of teaching services to the residential real estate market. This mar-
ket is generally comprised of an equal number of buyers and sellers
of homes. Some individual buyers and sellers do not attempt to
utilize a real estate agent for negotiating and transacting because
they believe that they can make a better bargain on their own.
Others, however, voluntarily utilize the services of real estate agents
to lower their transaction costs. As anyone who has purchased a
house knows, a real estate sale is a complex transaction. Real estate
agents specialize in such transactions and lower information search
costs by acting as a central depository of information of prices,
characteristics and sale terms of houses in the area.
These savings are apportioned among: (1) the buyer in the form
of a lower price of housing; (2) the seller in the form of a higher price
received than if he did not list with the agent; and (3) the agent in
the form of a commission. Note that all three participants gain
through voluntary agreements without compulsion. Thus, in a com-
petitive market, while transaction costs can often be lowered by the
use of agents, there will be competing agents in the'market. Collec-
tive bargaining agents, reflecting the interests of a collectivity of
buyers and sellers through a majority voting rule, will typically not
emerge.55 The example need not be confined to real estate; employ-
ment agencies, stock brokers, department stores and automobile
dealers all serve to reduce transaction costs in the same manner.
Returning to the case of the educational labor market, it is
possible to imagine a world in which each teacher hires an agent just
as he or she employs an agent to purchase a house. Given this
market setting it would be difficult to imagine, where each individ-
ual teacher possesses unique qualities, that he or she would be will-
ing to deal with an agent who bargained for a unitary wage simulta-
neously on behalf of several principals, perhaps not as highly quali-
fied.
55. Majority voting rules do not govern transactions in the competitive market. Instead,
dollar votes, based upon the resources each individual is willing to expend on his particular
wants, determine the goods that will be produced and consumed by society. Since people have
different wants and resources, a system of allocation of goods based upon majority voting
rules is highly unlikely to emerge in a free society which respects individual property rights.
See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: THEORY IN USE 50-51 (1969).
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To take a -simple illustration, imagine a situation where there
are five teachers of varying qualifications. Assume that the first
teacher has a marginal productivity" worth $5,000 per year; the
second, $10,000; the third, $15,000; the fourth, $20,000; and the
fifth, $25,000. If private and separate contracting was followed,
there would be five separate transactions using a maximum of five
separate agents. Furthermore, assume that each contract has nego-
tiation costs equal to $100. The total transaction costs would then
be $500. Next, assume that an agent approaches all of the teachers
with the proposition that he could reduce the total transaction costs
from $500 to something just above $100 provided he was given per-
mission to negotiate a uniform wage which is the average of the
presently earned wages, $15,000 per annum. Each teacher would
then have to face negotiation costs of just over $20 instead of $100.
While there is no proof that this reduction is possible, assume that
everyone concerned believes that it is achievable. Such a proposi-
tion would clearly produce the expected public good of reduced
negotiation costs. It would nevertheless be rejected under private
voluntary contracting because two of the teachers, namely those
already earning $20,000 and $25,000, would be worse off. The pro-
posed transaction would, in addition to reducing negotiation costs,
compress wage differentials. Only coercion of some kind could
achieve this result.
Consider the alternative example where a single agent offers to
organize a common transaction that would obtain a single wage of
$26,000 a year, which is just above the highest wage already being
earned. In the absence of promised teacher productivity improve-
ments, the agent could only do this by attempting to offer two
services: the service of reduced transaction costs and the service of
producing a labor monopoly for his clients that could force a wage
of $26,000. In all probability this arrangement would also fail be-
cause the change to a monopoly wage results in a move upwards
along the demand curve and, as a result, some teachers will lose
their jobs. The unemployed teachers would cease to have loyalty to
the bargaining agent and would no longer support the cartel. Their
return to the marketplace would result in their underbidding the
cartel which would then cause its breakup and a return to the five
separate wages at the lower average of $15,000. For the monopoly
to be viable, therefore, the single agent has to have full control of
the supply of labor.
In a third scenario, the single agent, realizing that private coer-
56. Marginal productivity equals the wage that the individual would receive in a compet-
itive market for his labor. See G. STIGLER, supra note 33, at 239-42.
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cion is insufficient and that the government power of legislation
alone will provide him with the necessary controls on the labor
supply, decides to turn to the political process. After successful
lobbying, the government enacts legislation that results in a new
wage of $26,000 and prevents the employer from employing anybody
at less than this wage. The latter provision creates the power of
coercion that is necessary to make the monopoly viable. Moreover,
the chances of the lobby succeeding will be increased if, as is likely,
a majority of the five teachers can be obtained in support. Indeed,
it is not necessary to obtain a new monopoly wage of $26,000; a wage
of $16,000, for instance, would suffice because three out of the five
teachers would support it. In general, when the proposed mean wage
exceeds the present median, a majority of the employees can always
be predicted to favor redistribution in favor of the lower paid em-
ployees and a reduced dispersion of wages. It is not necessary for the
monopoly benefits of the new arrangement to be taken out entirely
in the form of monetary income increases. There are a variety of
ways, all of them nonpecuniary, of obtaining equal benefits. For
instance, teachers may bargain for preferred curricula, increased
vacations or a reduction in hours."7
The negotiator will lobby the government with the argument
that the chief benefit from the new arrangement, effected through
the agency shop, is a reduction in transaction costs. Based on the
assumptions of the posited model, these transaction costs are ex-
pected to be reduced from $500 to something just above $100. This
will be the public good or service aspect of the agent's argument to
the legislature. He will also argue that he is unable to achieve this
cost savings because individuals will not operate voluntarily to
achieve the same result due to a tendency to free ride. The agent,
of course, will not make conspicuous the other and more important
cost of his proposal, the cost of monopoly pricing."8
V. CONCLUSION
A critical economic analysis of the underlying policy rationales
given in support of mandatory agency shops within the public sector
reveals the existence of economic ramifications not usually taken
57. It should be expected that, as higher incomes are negotiated, there will be increasing
pressure to take benefits in reduced hours because leisure is not taxed, while marginal incre-
ments to income are.
58. A testable hypothesis arising out of this reasoning is that collective bargaining via
legislatively-induced union and agency shops will be followed by a reduction in the dispersion
of wages. This hypothesis has been firmly supported by recent empirical tests. R. Free-
man, Unionism and the Dispersion of Wages (June 1978) (Harvard University Discussion
Paper, No. 629 on file University of Miami Law Review).
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into account in governmental decisionmaking on the subject. Courts
and legislatures have too often relied upon considerations of in-
dustrial peace and stability or unequal bargaining power to justify
mandatory collective bargaining under majority voting rules with-
out giving due regard to the economic costs borne by society due to
the abrogation of the competitive marketplace. This commentary
has demonstrated that these costs could include monopoly rents
appropriated by the exclusive bargaining agents at the expense of
the taxpayer and the employee, increased unemployment and mo-
nopoly pricing. The economic concepts of free rider and forced rider
have been utilized to examine critically the proposition of permit-
ting competition in the public sector employment market and to
question the traditional arguments supporting compulsory collec-
tive bargaining.
Moreover, federal labor law has developed largely within the
context of the private labor market and has been targeted at re-
dressing unfair bargaining power and promoting labor peace. In
Abood, the Court focused its analysis on labor peace. Consequently,
assuming that unfair bargaining power is not a problem, the only
argument the Court could use to support its analysis was the sup-
posed irritation caused by free riders and the ability of agency shops
to reduce and distribute fairly the transaction costs of bargaining.
It has been shown, however, that if unfair bargaining power is not
initially a problem, the adoption of an agency shop can create unfair
bargaining power of a different form. The agency shop establishes
a monopoly on one side of the bargaining process-the union. This
results in unfair bargaining from the perspective of the buyers of
labor, the taxpayer and those employees who lose their jobs from the
reduced demand for labor. Thus, reliance upon the premises under-
lying a body of law meant to regulate the private labor market is
inappropriate when analyzing a case arising in the public labor
market.
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